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This	 paper	 documents	 new	 yearly	 estimates	 of	 income	 inequality	 in	 Italy	




changes	 during	 this	 period.	 We	 identify	 a	 steep	 decline	 in	 inequality	 in	 Italy	















In	 recent	 years,	 economists,	 historians,	 and	 social	 scientists	 have	 been	
increasingly	 involved	 in	 an	 international,	 scholarly,	 and	 public	 debate	 on	 the	
dynamics	and	causes	of	economic	inequality.	Since	Kuznets’	(1955)	seminal	work,	





20th	 century’s	 reductions	 in	 inequality	 took	 place	 in	 advanced	 economies	
(Milanovic,	 2016;	 Piketty,	 2014),	 however,	 recent	 research	 has	 shown	 diverging	
distributional	histories	 in	Europe	 in	 these	 turbulent	years	 (Bartels,	2019;	Gómez	






Crucially,	 the	 lack	 of	 data	 on	 income	 distribution	 for	 the	 interwar	 years	
makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 identify	 short-term	 changes	 in	 inequality	 over	 this	 period.	
Milanovic	 (2016,	p.	78)	noted	 that	 in	 Italy,	 in	 particular,	 the	 current	 state	of	 the	
evidence	means	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 “to	 detect	 any	 influence	 of	 fascism”,	 since	 the	
estimates	available	for	1921	and	1931	show	“no	change	in	the	Gini”,	and	the	strong	
reduction	visible	in	1948	was	“most	likely	explained,	as	in	other	countries,	by	the	
effect	 of	 war	 and	 not	 by	 fascism	 per	 se”	 (Figure	 1).	 In	 light	 of	 the	 severe	







de	 la	 Escosura	 (2008)	 based	 on	 a	 similar	 approach.	 Finally,	 those	 of	 Italy	 -based	 on	 Historical	
Household	Budgets-	are	from	Amendola	and	Vecchi	(2017).		
	
In	 this	 article,	 we	 contribute	 to	 this	 literature	 by	 presenting	 new	 annual	
series	of	overall	 income	inequality	 in	 Italy,	between	1900	and	1950	–	that	 is,	 the	
entire	period	from	the	first	industrialisation	of	the	country,	to	the	dawn	of	the	post-
war	‘miracle’,	covering	both	world	wars	and	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	Fascist	regime.	
We	 build	 so-called	 dynamic	 social	 tables,	 and	 obtain	 consistent	 estimates	
comparable	to	those	for	other	European	countries.	The	results	for	Italy	support	and	
extend	recent	findings	which	have	highlighted	the	‘turbulent’	dynamics	of	inequality	
in	 the	 interwar	period	(Gómez	León	and	de	 Jong,	2019),	suggesting	the	potential	
role	 of	 different	 national	 policies	 in	 driving	 inequality	 (Piketty,	 2020),	 even	 in	
response	to	‘redistributive’	shocks	such	as	wars	and	major	depressions.	Our	results	
reveal	a	steep	decline	in	inequality	after	the	Great	War	(driven	by	the	within-labour	
component),	 and	 then	 a	 sharp	 reversal	 that	 followed	 between	 1922	 and	 1931,	
followed	by	a	‘plateau’,	and	again,	an	increase	during	WWII,	and	thus	partially	revise	
and	 qualify	 the	 secular	 decrease	 documented	 in	 income	 inequality,	 by	means	 of	
























within	 the	 literature	on	 income	 inequality	 in	 interwar	Europe,	 and	 the	economic	
history	of	fascist	Italy;	section	3	describes	the	dynamic	social	tables	methodology;	







As	mentioned	 in	 the	previous	section,	within	 the	broader	debate	on	 long-
term	 trends	 in	 income	 inequality,	 recent	 research	 has	 enlarged	 the	 picture	 of	
inequality	in	interwar	Europe.	According	to	influential	works	such	as	Piketty	(2014)	
and	 Scheidel	 (2018),	 after	 a	 long-term	 increase	 in	 inequality	 that	 started	 in	 the	
Middle	 Ages	 and	 culminated	 in	 the	 age	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘first	 globalisation’,	 the	
middle	decades	of	the	20th	century,	characterised	by	two	devastating	conflicts,	the	
dissolution	of	empires,	and	the	collapse	of	global	trade	after	the	Great	Depression,	
would	 have	 contributed	 greatly	 to	 a	 reverse	 in	 this	 trend,	 leading	 to	 a	 general		
reduction	in	inequality	in	wealthy	countries.		
While	the	extremely	high	levels	of	inequality	on	the	eve	of	the	20th	century	
could	 even	 have	 caused	 the	 Great	War,	 as	 recently	 reassessed	 by	 Hauner	 er	 al.	
(2020),	a	series	of	top	income	shares	for	France	and	the	US	(Piketty,	2014,	pp.	290-






leading	European	economies,	 such	as	Britain	and	Germany.	 Indeed,	despite	 both	
being	 affected	 by	 such	 strong,	 ‘malign’	 inequality-reducing	mechanisms,	 the	 two	
leading	 European	 economies	 followed	 alternative	 paths	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘Great	
Levelling’	(Milanovic,	2016,	p.	53).		
Top	 income	 series	 for	 Germany	 also	 led	 Bartels	 (2019)	 to	 conclude	 that	
“World	 War	 I	 did	 not	 act	 as	 the	 great	 leveler”,	 but	 “brought	 a	 large-scale	
redistribution	 from	 labour	 to	 capital	 which	 the	 November	 revolution	 of	 1918	
intended	 to	 reverse”.	 For	 a	 more	 peripheral	 European	 economy,	 such	 as	 Spain,	
Prados	 de	 la	 Escosura	 (2008)	 had	 already	 showed	 that	 the	 Kuznets-style	
relationship	between	inequality	and	development	was	broken	by	the	Civil	War,	and	












mixture	 of	 external,	 ‘exogenous’	 shocks,	 and	 policy	 choices.	 Although	 it	 didn’t	
experience	 the	hyperinflation	 that	 characterised	Weimar	Germany,	 Italy	was	still	
affected	by	severe	distributional	conflicts	in	the	troubled	‘red	biennium’	(Zamagni,	
1991)	and	the	 following	 ‘black’	one,	eventually	resulting	 in	Mussolini’s	seizure	of	
power.		After	a	brief	‘liberal’	phase	(in	which,	however,	the	new	fascist	government	
	 6	
dismantled	 labour	 unions2	 and	 promoted	 pro-business	 fiscal	 policies),3	 the	mid-
1920s	marked	the	beginning	of	deflationary	policies	(the	 infamous	 ‘battle	 for	 the	
lira’,	 or	Quota	90),	 and	eventually	protectionism	(Giordano	and	Giugliano,	2015),	








The	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 income	 distribution	 in	 Italy	 between	 the	 two	
world	 wars	 is	 currently	 still	 limited,	 however.	 Giovanni	 Vecchi	 and	 co-authors	
estimated	decadal	Gini	figures	from	1861	to	1931,	based	on	an	innovative	database	
of	historical	household	budget,	and	documented	a	long-term	decrease	in	inequality	
(actually,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 ‘Kuznets	 curve’)	 for	 the	 country.4	 Their	 results	
revealed	a	secular	decrease	in	inequality,	but	cannot	shed	light	on	crucial,	shorter-
term	 dynamics,	 such	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 world	 wars,	 and	 most	 notably,	 what	
happened	in	the	1930s,	when	the	dramatic	recession	was	followed	by	more	dirigiste	
economic	 policies,	 a	 shift	 towards	 ‘autarchy’,	 and	 almost	 a	 decade	 of	 warfare	
following	the	aggression	in	Ethiopia	(1935)	(Gabbuti,	2020b).		
After	 the	 early	 contributions	 by	 Sylos	 Labini	 (1974)	 and	 Zamagni	 (1980)	
(respectively	based	on	census	data	and	wage	series),	the	only	attempt	to	address	
the	 issue	 in	 quantitative	 terms	 was	 by	 Gabbuti	 (2020a),	 who	 presented	 new	













working	 population	 that	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 self-employed	 (small	 and	
medium	entrepreneurs,	shopkeepers,	but	also	farmers,	sharecroppers	and	tenants);	
non-labour	 incomes,	 comprising	 around	 half	 the	 national	 income	 during	 these	
decades	(Giordano	and	Zollino,	2021,	p.	42);	and	women,	a	crucial	component	of	the	





and	 pay	 gaps	 in	 the	 picture,	 due	 either	 to	 methodological	 issues,	 or	 source	
limitations.6		
We	 use	 dynamic	 social	 tables,	 obtained	 by	 combining	 data	 on	 the	
occupational	 structure	 from	 population	 censuses	 with	 information	 on	 earnings	
linked	 to	different	work	 categories	 distinguishing	 by	work	 status	 and	gender,	 to	
move	 beyond	 the	 current	 empirical	 evidence.	 Dynamic	 social	 tables	 allow	 us	 to	
obtain	 yearly	 direct	 estimates	 of	 inequality	 (Ginis)	 for	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 20th	
century	 that	 cover	 the	whole	 range	 of	 the	 distribution,	 as	well	 as	 to	 explore	 the	







(Sylos	 Labini,	 1974),	 given	 the	 long-term,	 “strong	 presence	 of	 an	 industrial	 and	




include	 this	 dimension,	while	 Italian	 fiscal	 sources,	 such	 as	 those	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4,	 do	 not	
tabulate	women	separately.		






literature	 to	 consistently	 estimate	 them	 in	 benchmark	 years	 for	 many	 different	
sectors,	making	possible	 to	discuss,	 in	Section	5,	 their	contribution	to	the	overall	
dynamics	of	inequality.	Finally,	despite	the	many	source	limitations	(not	exclusive	
to	Italy),	this	paper	also	explicitly	addresses	the	underestimation	of	capital	income	
in	 historical	 estimates	 of	 personal	 income	 inequality	 in	 Italy,	 recently	 raised	 by	
Gabbuti	 (2021a)	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 factor	 shares.	 Here	 our	 estimates	 are	
necessarily	more	tentative,	and	further	research	 is	definitely	needed	 in	this	 field.		
The	dynamic	social	tables	presented	here	can	be	seen	an	‘infrastructure’,	however,	



























different	 social	 groups	 and	 the	 estimated	 average	 incomes	 that	 can	 be	 linked	 to	
these	groups.	The	methodology,	 conceptually	very	 similar	 to	 that	 applied	 for	 the	
construction	of	national	accounts,	permits	to	cover	a	representative	sample	of	the	
population	 to	 be	 considered,	 and	 moreover	 captures	 the	 whole	 range	 of	 the	
distribution.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 include	 the	 total	 distribution	 when	 studying	
inequality	in	periods	of	rapid	structural	change	(linked	to	sectoral	shifts	and	inter-
occupational	 inequalities),	 when	 changes	 in	 inequality	 are	 mostly	 linked	 to	
increasing	 differences	 between	 the	 middle	 and	 lower	 part	 of	 the	 income	
distribution.	Social	tables,	however,	are	limited	by	the	lack	of	information	on	family	
structures	 (unlike	household	 surveys)	and	 the	 level	of	disaggregation	within	 the	
richest	 group	 (unlike	 fiscal	 sources).	 They	 are	 also	 limited	 by	 the	 potential	
underestimation	 of	 inequality	when	 the	 number	 of	 groups	 is	 small,	 or	when	 the	
members	 of	 a	 group	 are	 considered	 to	 share	 the	 same	 average	 income.	 These	
sources	of	bias	can,	however,	be	mitigated	by	introducing	the	largest	possible	level	
of	disaggregation	within	each	occupational	group.	
Conventionally,	 social	 tables	 have	 been	 used	 to	 estimate	 inequality	 for	
particular	benchmark	years.	A	more	recent	approach	initiated	by	Rodriguez	Weber	
(2014),	 and	 applied	 by	Gómez-León	 (2019;	 2020)	 and	Gómez-León	 and	 de	 Jong	
(2019),	however,	allows	inequality	to	be	assessed	across	longer	periods,	by	letting	
both	the	population	shares	and	income	of	different	social	groups	move	on	an	annual	
basis.11	We	follow	this	approach,	and	construct,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	dynamic	social	
tables	 for	 Italy	 from	1901	 to	 1950	 –	 that	 is,	 for	 the	 half	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 not	
covered	by	modern	household	surveys	of	 income	distribution.	 	While	not	exactly	
comparable	 to	 modern	 household	 survey	 data,	 when	 built	 adopting	 the	 same	
																																																								
9	See	Lindert	and	Williamson	(1982)	and	Allen	(2019)	for	Britain;	Gómez	León	and	de	Jong	(2019)	













follow	Milanovic	and	others,	 and	construct	social	 tables	with	 information	on	 the	
active	 population	 structure	 provided	 in	 the	 population	 censuses.12	 We	 use	
population	censuses	to	obtain	a	representative	sample	which	captures	the	whole	
range	 of	 the	 distribution	 (from	 owners	 at	 the	 top,	 to	 unoccupied	 people	 at	 the	
bottom).	Despite	 the	clear	 limitations,	starting	from	the	absence	of	“truly”	micro-
data,	the	advantage	of	the	dynamic	social	tables	is	to	offer	a	full	representation	of	
the	 basic,	macroeconomic,	 demographic	 and	 structural	 forces	 driving	 inequality,	
throughout	 the	 whole	 spectrum	 of	 the	 distribution,	 in	 their	 year-to-year	
development.13		
We	then	compile	nominal	 income	data	 linked	to	each	profession	(by	work	
status)	 from	different	sources,	 further	described	 in	the	 following	section.	We	use	
information	 from	 secondary	 sources	 to	 incorporate	 gender	 differences,	 also	
explained	in	the	next	section	and	further	detailed	in	the	appendix.	Notably,	resulting	










where	n	 is	 the	 number	 of	 social	 classes;	 μ	 is	 the	 overall	mean	 income,	 pi	 is	 the	
proportion	of	people	belonging	to	the	i-th	social	class;	and	yi	is	the	mean	income	of	





household	 budgets	 and	 tax	 records	 (Gómez-León	 and	de	 Jong,	 2019,	 p.	 6),	 and	 a	 comparison	 of	





Information	 on	 the	 active	 population	 structure	 by	 profession	 is	 obtained	
from	 the	 population	 censuses,	 along	 with	 inter-census	 headcount	 of	 workers	





Adige,	 Gorizia,	 eastern	 Friuli	 and	 part	 of	 Slovenia	 and	 Croatia,	 and	 the	 city	 of	
Trieste),	some	of	which	were	 lost	after	 the	Second	World	War,	and	therefore	not	
included	in	1951.	In	order	to	avoid	these	territorial	changes	affecting	our	estimates,	
we	 followed	 the	 adjustment	 proposed	 by	 the	 statistician	Vitali	 (1968),	 to	obtain	



















16	 Although	 considered	 positively	 even	 by	 a	 gender	 historian	 such	 as	 Patriarca	 (1988),	 Vitali’s	
correction	 is	 probably	 an	 underestimation;	 looking	 at	 the	 differences	 between	 agrarian	 and	
population	censuses,	Mancini	(2018)	adjusted	the	total	number	of	women	employed	in	agriculture	
even	further.	She	did	not	provide	separate	figures	for	peasants,	sharecroppers,	and	the	like,	however,	




female	 labour	 forces	 (67	 and	 33	 per	 cent,	 respectively),	 and	 male	 and	 female	
unemployed	(64	vs.	36	per	cent).17		
The	 number	 of	 occupations	 was	 standardised	 to	 18	 to	 make	 censuses	
comparable	 across	 time.18	 We	 also	 re-classified	 work	 categories	 into	 three	 for	
agriculture	(owners,	self-employed,	and	wage	earners);	one	for	owners	in	industry,	
commerce	 and	 transport;	 three	 for	 industry	 (self-employed,	 salary-earners	 and	




Once	 the	 censuses	 were	 homogenised,	 we	 applied	 interpolation	methods	
between	the	census	benchmark	years	in	order	to	obtain	annual	data	on	the	active	
population	 structure	 of	 Italy	 between	 1901	 and	 1950.	 To	 obtain	 more	 accurate	
figures,	as	well	as	for	reasons	of	consistency	with	existing	evidence,	we	adjusted	our	













Source:	 authors’	 elaborations	 on	 population	 censuses	 and	 labour	 input	 series	 by	 Giordano	 and	
Zollino	(2015)	–	for	full	details,	see	Appendix,	Tables	A1-A3.	
As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 2,	 the	 resulting	 series	 makes	 the	 strong	 structural	
changes	 experienced	 in	 this	 period	 clear,	 where	 the	 share	 of	 the	 population	
employed	in	agriculture	in	all	occupational	conditions	declined	from	60	to	less	than	
40	per	cent.	The	proportion	of	women	also	fell	from	35	to	25	per	cent,	with	a	plateau	
in	 the	 1930s.20	 This	 overall	 reduction	 was	 mainly	 driven	 by	 agriculture	 (which	
remained	the	main	sector	of	women’s	activity,	but	declined	from	65%	to	49%	of	the	
female	 working	 population),	 while	 the	 smaller	 proportions	 of	 women	 in	 the	
services,	professions,	and	even	heavy	industry	increased	more	or	less	constantly,	in	
this	period.21		













































of	 the	 ‘active’	 population	 that	 is	 not	 in	 professional	 condition;	 an	 increase,	
particularly	 strong	 after	 the	 Great	 Depression	 (Toniolo	 and	 Piva,	 1988),	 which	
probably	reflects	a	strong	 increase	 in	unemployment,	which	 is	hard	to	detect	via	
‘official’	 sources,	 and	 often	 ‘hidden’	 by	 both	 population	 and	 industrial	 censuses	
(Alberti,	2018).		
Incomes	of	Dependent	Workers		
Annual	 estimations	 of	 the	 average	 income	 associated	 with	 dependent	
workers	in	industry	are	mostly	based	on	Zamagni	(1975,	1984,	1995),	from	which	
we	obtained	data	 for	dependent	workers	across	12	branches.	We	had	 to	 rely	on	
other	sources,	however,	for	the	uncovered	years,	and	differences	in	work	status,.23	
For	instance,	Zamagni	(1980,	p.	38)	mentioned	that	the	incomes	of	salary-earners	
in	 industry	matched	those	of	clerks	 in	public	administration	or	 the	 lower	ranked	
civil	 servant	 employees.	 Meanwhile,	 Rey	 and	 Vitali	 (1991)	 provide	 annual	 data	
(between	 1900	 and	 1950)	 for	 government	 civil	 employees,	 across	 different	
categories	(directive,	executive	and	auxiliary	careers),	distributed,	in	turn,	by	work	
status	levels	(ten	in	total),	from	the	highest	to	the	lowest	remunerated	(e.g.	general	




an	 individual	 category.	 Nevertheless,	 given	 the	 small	 proportion	 of	 this	 group	
(compared	to	self-employed	and	dependent	workers),	we	do	not	think	it	would	have	





bourgeoisie”,	 our	 series	 captures	 the	 increase	 in	 this	 group	 between	 1921	 and	 1951,	 especially	






We	 rely	 on	 Zamagni	 (1980)	 for	 dependent	 workers	 in	 transport,	 public	
administration,	 liberal	professions,	 services	 and	 commerce;	 and	we	 extrapolated	
data	 for	uncovered	years	based	on	the	evolution	of	 annual	 incomes	 for	 the	most	
similar	occupations	in	Rey	and	Vitali	(1991)	and	Istat	(1953),	which,	also	provides	









earnings	 have	 been	 estimated	 from	 the	 gender	 ratios	 (female	 earnings	 as	 a	
percentage	of	male	earnings)	obtained	 from	both	 the	 secondary	 literature	 (most	
notably,	Bettio,	1988)	and	primary	 sources	 (in	particular,	 the	Annuario	Statistico	
Italiano).26	These	sources	enabled	us	to	identify	material	to	build	separate	ratios	for	
agriculture,	 industry	 (here	 distinguishing	 between	 heavy	 and	 light	 industries),	
transport,	commerce,	public	administration,	 liberal	professions	and	services.	The	
sources	 for	 these	sectors	provided	us	with	 information	on	gender	gaps	 for	1901,	
1911,	 1914,	 1918,	 1925,	 1938	 and	 1951.	 Annual	 series	 were	 obtained	 by	
interpolating	the	ratios	between	available	benchmark	years,	with	the	exception	of	
agriculture,	 for	which	 the	 statistical	 abstract	 provides	 us	with	 annual	 estimates,	
from	1911	to	1950.	
Incomes	of	the	Self-Employed	










employed	 an	 income	 slightly	 above	 that	 perceived	 by	 those	 working	 as	 waged	
labour	 in	 the	 same	sectors,	 as	 this	 is	 a	 common	practice	when	estimating	 labour	
shares	 (Bengtsson	 and	Waldenström,	 2018).	 This	 alternative	 inevitably	 excludes	
any	variation	in	the	relative	position	of	the	self-employed,	however,	with	respect	to	
both	waged	workers	and	‘capitalists’	in	their	same	sectors.	While	this	is	not	an	issue	
when	 assessing	 inequality	 trends	 through	 variation	 in	 labour	 shares,	 a	 better	
understanding	 of	 the	 variation	 within	 the	 group	 of	 workers	 is	 crucial	 for	
understanding	the	‘political	economy’	of	the	fascist	regime.	For	this	reason,	we	made	
our	best	efforts	to	arrive	at	alternative	estimates	for	self-employed.			
We	 use	 daily	wages	 in	 agriculture	 (from	 the	 Statistical	 Abstract)	 and	 the	
assumption	made	by	Giordano	and	Zollino	(2015)	on	the	number	of	working	days	
for	 owner-occupiers,	 tenants	 and	 share-croppers	 for	 the	 self-employed	 in	
agriculture	 (small	 owners,	 share-croppers,	 and	 tenants).28	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	
potential	 double	 counting,	 we	 were	 also	 forced	 to	 treat	 female	 owners	 as	 self-
employed,	 since	 the	 wives	 of	 owners	 were	 inconsistently	 recorded	 as	 owners	
themselves,	 or	 as	 labourers	 (Pescarolo,	 2019,	 p.	 58).	 Although	 unsatisfactory	 –	
especially	 because	 we	 were	 forced	 to	 impose	 the	 same	 income	 on	 a	 very	
heterogeneous	group	-	this	seems	the	only	viable	alternative	at	the	moment.		
We	propose	 to	 use	 a	 different,	 innovative	 source	 for	 the	 self-employed	 in	
industry	 and	 services:	 official	 fiscal	 statistics	 reporting	 individual	 taxpayers’	
incomes,	assessed	for	the	purpose	of	the	Imposta	di	ricchezza	mobile,	the	main	direct	
income	tax	of	the	period.	In	particular,	the	Direzione	Generale	per	le	Imposte	Dirette	














Schedule	B	 for	our	purpose,:	 the	so-called	 ‘mixed	 incomes’,	 the	business	 incomes	
obtained	by	combining	capital	and	work	(unfortunately,	excluding	most	of	those	in	
agriculture,	who	were	subject	 to	a	different	 type	of	 tax).	 In	 this	sense,	 it	is	worth	
noting	that	while	some	of	the	taxpayers	in	Category	B	were	rich	entrepreneurs	(such	
as	the	engineer	Camillo	Olivetti,	founder	of	the	homonymous	type-writing	machine),	
it	 excluded	 legal	 entities,	 such	 as	 the	 car-making	 FIAT,	 and	 their	 shareholders,	
members	of	the	Agnelli	family.	Indeed,	the	vast	majority	of	declarations	were	made	






transport,	 our	 baseline	 series	 for	 those	 three	 groups	 of	 self-employed	 will	 be	
obtained	 as	 an	 average	 of	 the	 declared	 incomes,	 adjusted	 by	 one	 third	 to	 take	
evasion	 and	 exemptions	 in	 consideration,	 and	 the	 average	 wage	 earned	 in	 the	
respective	 sector	by	wage	earners.	As	 reported	 in	 the	appendix	 (Figure	A.4),	 the	

















































industry	and	private	services	are	obtained	analogously,	but	only	 for	 the	 respective	sector	 (in	 the	
latter	 case,	 excluding	 professionals	 and,	 from	 services	 value	 added,	 miscellaneous	 services	 and	
location	of	buildings).	
While	 it	 is	not	our	goal	 to	propose	a	 refined	version	of	 the	 labour	 shares,	
residual	 income	can	be	used	 to	obtain	a	 first,	yearly	proxy	of	 the	 incomes	of	 the	
owners	groups.	As	shown	in	the	same	figure,	we	can	obtain	separate	labour	shares	
for	agriculture,	and	for	industry	and	the	services	-	in	this	sense,	obtaining	a	more	






































respective	 sectors	 in	our	baseline.33	The	 resulting	 levels	 are	also	 in	 line	with	 the	
evidence	 from	 tabulations	 in	 the	 less	 ‘troubled’	 years.34	 While	 more	 direct	 and	
continuous	evidence	on	these	incomes	will	definitely	improve	our	understanding	of	
this	period,	with	the	current	state	of	the	evidence,	this	seems	the	most	reliable	way	








Figure	4	 shows	direct	 estimates	of	 inequality	 (Ginis)	 among	workers.	Our	

















intense	 labour	 unrest.	 Industrial	 workers	 in	 particular	 managed	 to	 obtain	















increased	 (up	 to	 37)	 reaching	 its	 absolute	maximum.	 Inequality	 among	workers	
decreased	constantly	in	the	following	years,	and,	significantly,	also	in	the	late	1930s,	



















1935,	 the	 regime	 partly	 “loosened	 the	 reins”	 of	 trade	 unions,	 making	 “some	
concessions	to	working	classes”	(arguably	 in	an	effort	 to	strengthen	the	 ‘internal	
front’)	 (Musso,	 2016,	 pp.	 276-279);	 this	 included	 some	 long-awaited	 wage	
adjustments	 for	 inflation,	 after	 years	 in	 which	 wage	 compression,	 according	 to	
Zamagni	(1975,	pp.	547-548),	was	“a	deliberate	economic	policy”,	resulting	 in	an	





The	 decline	 observed	 during	 WWII	 is	 clearly	 the	 result	 of	 a	 strong,	





between	 the	 various	 categories	 of	 blue	 and	white	 collars,	 as	well	 as	 the	 average	
difference	between	wages	and	salaries,	and	between	the	incomes	of	dependent	and	
independent	workers’,	with	the	 latter	 ‘initially	going	to	very	 low	levels’,	but	 then	
‘more	rapidly	adjusting	to	the	value	of	money’	(BdI,	1947,	pp.	100-101).		
Figure	4	shows	that,	when	including	the	female	labour	force	in	the	sample,	
inequality	 levels	 increase.	 This	 is	 the	 result	 of	 both	 the	 lower	 average	 incomes	
received	 by	 female	workers	 (disproportionally	 employed	 in	 low-pay	 sectors	 and	
occupations),	and	the	gender	pay	gap	with	respect	to	their	male	counterparts	when	















‘inequality	 forces’,	 which	 helps	 us	 to	 obtain	 a	 wider	 understanding	 of	 the	
mechanisms	driving	changes	in	inequality	between	workers.	The	first	mechanism,	
the	gender	 ratio	 (left	 figure),	 is	 the	 ratio	between	male	and	 female	 incomes,	 and	
indicates	variations	 in	 inequality	resulting	 from	changes	 in	gender	pay	gaps.	The	
second	mechanism,	the	skill	ratios	(right	figure),	is	the	ratio	between	the	incomes	of	





one	 of	 the	 major	 “inequality	 forces”	 contributing	 to	 the	 Italian	 ‘Great	 Levelling’	
throughout	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century.	Despite	the	source	and	methodological	
differences,	our	series,	in	the	same	way	as	Federico	et	al.’s	(2021,	p.	15),	show	an	




strongest	 in	 heavy	 industry,	 but	 common	 to	 all	 sectors,	 including	 the	 various	
services.	 This	 ‘positive’	 equalisation	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 wage	 compression,	
imposed	on	industrial	workers	in	the	first	year	of	fascist	government	(Bettio,	1988).	








Notes:	 Solid	 lines	 (represented	 on	 the	 left	 y-axes)	 show	 annual	 development	 of	 different	 ratios.	
Dashed	 lines	 (represented	 on	 the	 right	 y-axes)	 show	 annual	 trends	 in	 within-labour	 inequality	
(Figure	 4,	 All	workers).	 inequality.	 The	gender	 ratio	 is	 the	weighted	average	 of	 females	 vs.	male	
incomes,	it	includes	all	sectors.	The	skill	ratio	is	a	weighted	average	of	salary	vs.	wage	earners,	by	
sector;	 it	 excludes,	 therefore,	workers	 in	 agriculture	 (for	 sectoral	 ratios,	 see	Appendix,	 Fig.	 A.7),	
professionals,	personal	services	and	people	without	specified	profession.	
	Wage	pay	gaps	will	continue	to	decrease	from	this	point	on,	mainly	due	to	
the	 changing	 composition	 of	 female	workers,	who	 are	 less	 and	 less	 employed	 in	
agriculture	 (De	 Grand,	 1976),	 rather	 than	 from	 a	 reduction	 in	 gender	 pay	
inequalities.	 Despite	 the	 fascist’s	 regime	 strong	 rhetoric	 against	 female	
employment,	Italian	women	slowly,	but	constantly,	increased	their	presence	in	the	
commerce,	 services	 and	 health	 care	 sectors	 in	 these	 years,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 heavy	
industry,	and	 in	the	 light	 industry	(textile,	and	the	 like),	 female	employment	was	
linked	to	the	economic	cycle,	rather	than	to	the	success	of	discriminatory	policies	
(Pescarolo,	2019,	p.	237;	Gabbuti,	2020b,	pp.	267-271).	Contrary	to	the	experience	
in	 the	1921-1931,	however,	 the	collective	bargaining	 imposed	by	 fascists	did	not	
bring	more	equality	to	women	(Musso,	1992).37	Only	after	WWII,	with	democracy	
and	 free	 trade	 unions,	was	 equality	 established	 on	 a	more	 positive	 basis,	within	
general	pay	increases	and	economic	growth	–	but	then	the	female	participation	rate	
would	collapse	again,	reaching	its	absolute	historical	minimum	in	1961	(Mancini,	






















































































































to	 improve;	nonetheless,	 it	 remained	high,	 and	close	 to	 the	peak	 for	most	of	 the	




effective	way	 in	which	the	 fascist	regime	managed	to	constraint	 labour:	 from	the	
mid-1920s,	official,	‘corporatist’	trade	unions	were	the	only	representatives	of	the	
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in	 the	gap	between	waged	and	salaried	workers,	 and	moreover	a	 reversal	 in	 the	
short-term	reduction	of	labour	income	inequality	resulting	from	the	the	Great	War.		






years	 of	 1914-1919	saw	 all	 these	 groups	 losing	 ground,	 in	 comparison	with	 the	
waged	 workers.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 with	 some	 differences	 in	 both	 timing	 and	






































	Interestingly,	 the	 deflationary	 shift	 of	 1926	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 turning	 point	
(Cohen,	 1972):	 in	 the	 years	 of	 deflation,	 when	 wages	 and	 working	 hours	 were	
reduced	by	law,	the	Italian	middle	classes	(both	the	wealthier	white	collars,	and	the	
more	modest	shopkeepers	and	artisans)	seemed	to	prosper,	at	least	relative	to	the	












their	 trend.38	 The	 inclusion	 of	 owners	 incomes	 makes	 the	 decline	 in	 overall	
inequality	at	the	beginning	of	the	century	more	clear,	in	line	with	Vecchi	(2017),	and	
then	 ‘delays’	 the	 decrease	 in	 inequality	 to	 the	 red	 biennium	 –	 actually,	 the	 Gini	
increases	in	1917	and	1918,	peaking	at	53.	While	the	extent	of	the	1920s	reversal	is	






















































phase.	 When	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 regime	 became	 more	 anti-capitalistic,	 and	 the	
Fascists	claimed	to	be	“going	towards	the	people”,	the	owners	ratios	increased,	and	
even	 skyrocketed	 during	 the	 war	 years,	 meaning	 that	 inequality	 reached	 a	
maximum	peak	of	55	in	1944.	
Interestingly,	 the	 last	 years	 of	 our	 series	 show	 a	 fall	 sustained	 fall	 in	
inequality,	bringing	the	Gini	at	35	 in	1949,	 from	a	 level	close	to	50	 in	1901.	This	
‘levelling’	is	even	more	sustained	once	we	take	owners’	incomes	into	account,	but	it	
takes	 place	 almost	 entirely	 in	 the	 immediate	 aftermath	 of	 the	 war,	 during	 the	
“Reconstruction”	years.	The	 final	year	of	our	series	also	reveals	a	small	 increase,	








household	 budget	 surveys	 (1948,	 and	 then	 regularly	 from	 the	 late-1960s).	 The	
comparison	is	only	partially	meaningful,	given	the	different	definitions	(households	
vs.	 market	 income)	 and	 sources:	 while	 dynamic	 social	 tables	 are,	 due	 to	 their	
construction,	 able	 to	 reflect	 all	 the	 year	 by	 year	 variation	 between	 sectors	 and	
genders,	and	also	takes	into	account	trends	in	capital	incomes,	they	inevitably	miss	
all	 the	 variation	 within	 each	 of	 our	 groups.	 That	 said,	 a	 positive	 aspect	 of	 the	
inclusion	of	owners’	incomes	in	our	baseline,	and	reasonable	assumption	of	80%	of	








perfectly	 ‘fit’	 the	decadal	estimates	obtained	by	means	of	 the	household	budgets.	
While	not	altering	 the	 long-term	picture	of	declining	 income	 inequality,	dynamic	
social	tables	revealed	sizeable	short-term	distributive	episodes,	such	as	the	Great	





dynamic	 social	 tables	 with	 the	 micro-level	 evidence	 from	 historical	 household	
budgets,	 to	 fully	 capture	 between	 and	 within	 	 inequality;	 in	 any	 case,	 Figure	 8	










































(signalling	 most	 relevant	 short-term	 episodes),	 and	 allow	 us	 to	 identify	 how	
different	 segments	 of	 the	 workforce	 were	 affected	 during	 periods	 of	 economic	
expansion	 or	 economic	 downturn.41	 An	 upward	 trend	 indicates	 that	 the	 richest	
















































































































































































































































































































Finally,	we	 show	our	new	 inequality	 series	 for	 Italy	 from	an	 international	
perspective	in	Figure	10.	A	first	interesting	result	is	that	the	levels	of	inequality	do	




















managed,	 as	 did	 Britain,	 to	 avoid	 a	 substantial	 reduction	 in	 inequality	 in	 the	
following	years;	and	indeed,	as	in	Germany,	would	reach	new	peaks	of	inequality	in	
the	World	War	 II.	 	 In	 this	sense,	while	we	cannot	address	any	 causality	between	
Fascist	policies	and	inequality,	our	data	somehow	address	Milanovic’s	(2016,	pp.	77-




in	 1953	 (Prados	 de	 la	 Escosura,	 2008).	 In	 their	 own	 way,	 therefore,	 the	 fascist	

















1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Gi
ni
Britain Germany Spain Italy
	 34	








comparison,	 and	 even	 to	 investigate	 whether	 changes	 in	 inequality	 (and	





Using	 dynamic	 social	 tables,	 this	 paper	 presented	 new,	 yearly	 series	 of	
income	inequality	for	Italy	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	which	substantially	
revises	 the	distributive	history	of	 these	crucial	decades.	Results	confirm	the	 long	

















These	 new	 estimates	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 consistently	 compare	 income	
inequality	 in	 Italy	with	that	of	Britain,	Germany	and	Spain	over	the	same	period:	
despite	 the	 different	 stages	 of	 development,	 this	 revealed	 a	 comparable	 level	 of	
inequality	across	 the	 four	 countries,	 as	well	 as	 the	 common	regressive	 impact	of	
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1901	 17,134	 0.52	 0.65	 0.35	 0.63	 0.37	
1911	 18,653	 0.51	 0.65	 0.35	 0.64	 0.36	
1921	 20,139	 0.53	 0.67	 0.33	 0.76	 0.24	
1931	 20,869	 0.51	 0.68	 0.32	 0.65	 0.35	
1936	 22,674	 0.53	 0.67	 0.33	 0.55	 0.45	
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1901	 0.11	 0.26	 0.04	 0.56	 0.03	
1911	 0.08	 0.21	 0.05	 0.63	 0.03	
1921	 0.13	 0.21	 0.05	 0.57	 0.05	
1931	 0.14	 0.25	 0.08	 0.48	 0.05	
1936	 0.11	 0.26	 0.08	 0.45	 0.09	


























































































































































1939	 estimation	 projected	 forwards	 using	 the	





1939	 estimation	 projected	 forwards	 using	 the	






1939	 estimation	 projected	 forwards	 using	 the	






1939	 estimation	 projected	 forwards	 using	 the	



















































































































































based	 on	 the	 evolution	




























































































































































































As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4,	 the	main	 estimates	 of	 owners	 incomes	 in	 the	 paper	 are	 obtained	 by	
computing	 the	 residual	 value	 added,	 separately	 for	 agriculture,	 industry	 and	 private	 services	
(excluding	miscellaneous	services	and	 location	of	buildings),	after	 subtracting	 the	 total	 labour	of	
these	sectors,	obtained	by	summing	up	all	the	incomes	of	both	self	and	dependent	workers,	with	the	
exclusion	of	professionals	(the	resulting	labour	shares	are	reproduced	in	Figure	3).	In	order	to	avoid	
an	 overestimation	 of	 owners’	 incomes,	we	 adopted	80%	of	 this	 residual,	 for	 both	 sectors	 in	 our	
baseline	estimates.	As	shown	in	Figure	A.5,	the	years	1916-1918	show	a	sharp,	enormous	increase	in	










During	 both	World	Wars,	 simply	 projecting	 these	 values	 is	 insufficient	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	
changing	value	of	money:	for	this	reason,	in	1916-18	and	in	1946	we	adjusted	the	values	by	the	CPI,	













































































































































Figure	 7),	 alongside	with	 the	 two	 alternatives,	 based	 on	 the	 different	 owners	 incomes	 shown	 in	
Figures	A.5-6.	Apart	from	owners	series,	all	Gini	series	are	based	on	the	same	incomes	and	population	
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